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UNITED STATES V. LARA AS A STORY OF
NATIVE AGENCY
Bethany R. Berger*
Like our ancestors, we must do battle for the rights of our tribes, for our
survival as Indian nations and Indian people. Like they did, we must wage war on
every front where our rights are threatened. American politics is one such
battleground-a vast one, an important one, perhaps the most important one. If we
retreat from that theater, can we survive the Armageddon that will then be upon us?
America without conscience is Indian Apocalypse Now. Shall we throw in the
towel, sit this one out, preach to the choir, rest in the belly of that Great Beast?
No way.'
Indian tribes are not falling apart in the face of the Supreme Court's virtual
attack on tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction .... Rather, they are uniting to face the
Court.2
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lara3 must be understood
as the product of Indian agency,4 a defiant "no way" in the face of American
threats to tribal survival.
At first glance, this claim may seem strange. The decision upheld the power
of the federal government to criminally prosecute a member of the Turtle Bay
Objibwe Tribe. It relied in significant part on the "plenary power doctrine,"
according to which "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate
* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School (1996); B.A.,
Wesleyan University (1990). Sincere thanks to Robert Anderson, Virginia Boylan, Philip S. (Sam)
Deloria, Tadd Johnson, and particularly Nell Jessup Newton for helping me fill in historical gaps in this
story.
1. John P. LaVelle, Santee Sioux Professor and proud husband of a Standing Rock Sioux
Democratic activist, Connie Bear King, in John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through
Indian Participation in American Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Policy 533,
566 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
2. Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal Supreme Court Project, 37 New Eng.
L. Rev. 695, 696 (2003).
3. 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).
4. The most common use of the phrase "Indian agency" in American Indian Law is to describe the
agencies through which representatives of the federal government administered U.S. policy with
respect to Indian tribes. This essay uses the alternative meaning of agency, the faculty of acting or
exerting power. The history recounted here offers an opportunity to redefine this phrase, commonly
associated with a history of federal domination, to signify the control by Indian people of their own
fate. I am grateful to Professor LaVelle for this point.
TULSA LAW REVIEW
the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess." 5 Plenary
power has been decried as a "racist, eurocentric, and ultimately genocidal,
6
doctrine, deference to which is "closely related to the courts' failure to protect
Indian tribal rights,"7 and which reached its full expression in a series of late
nineteenth century cases asserting unrestrained federal power over groups
considered racially and politically inferior." Within weeks of the decision, at least
one scholar of Indian law and policy called the decision "deeply-distressing," 9 and
another contributor to this symposium hails it as a "Pyrrhic victory."'
An examination of the history and text of the decision, however, reveals that
not only did Indian country welcome the decision, but that it is a direct result of
fourteen years of tribal and native action, action whose unity and legal and
political sophistication fundamentally shaped both the issue before the Court and
the Court's reaction to it." The success of this concerted native agency, I will
argue, not only must shape our understanding of the Lara case, but also may
herald new control of Indian peoples over legal doctrines that were created to
destroy them.
In this essay, I first discuss the extent to which Indian law has historically
been shaped in the absence of the voices or concerns of Indian people. I then
acknowledge that while Lara may be seen, like so many Indian law cases, as one
decided by non-Indian concerns, it significantly departed from this familiar script.
In the next two sections, I detail the ways that deliberate action from Indian
country transformed the terms of the case and the tone of the decision, first by
developing the idea of congressional affirmance of inherent jurisdiction in
response to Duro v. Reina"1 and securing the passage of this "Duro fix" in
Congress, and second, by shaping the arguments before the United States
Supreme Court in Lara so as to ensure both success and promotion of an idea of
the tribal-federal relationship more consistent with tribal sovereignty. In
5. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
6. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor
Laurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 Ariz. L.
Rev. 439, 441 (1988).
7. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 195, 197 (1984).
8. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (2002).
9. David Wilkins, Justice Thomas and Federal Indian Law-Hitting His Stride, Indian Country
Today A4 (May 5, 2004).
10. William Bradford, "Another Such Victory and We Are Undone": A Call to an American Indian
Declaration of Independence, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 71, 71 (2004).
11. My claim that Lara and the Duro-fix were the product of Indian agency does not mean that
non-Indian people did not make crucial contributions. Nell Jessup Newton, one of the primary shapers
of the Duro-fix, Congressmen Bill Richardson and Daniel Inouye, crucial sponsors of the law, and
Riyaz Kanji, the author of the National Congress of American Indians' amicus brief in Lara are only a
few examples of the many non-Indian people that made essential contributions to the result. The
significant difference, however, is that they were guided by Indian country and its concerns rather than
guiding it, and were invited to participate and help rather than imposing a vision of what Indian
country needs.
12. 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that tribes had been divested of inherent jurisdiction over non-
member Indians).
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conclusion, I discuss what Indian agency may mean for our understanding of
Indian law.
I. INDIAN LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF INDIAN VOICES
To a striking degree, federal Indian law has been made in the absence of
the voices of the people it most intimately affects. Indeed, many significant
principles of Indian law have been decided in the absence of any dispute between
the parties at all. For example, although Fletcher v. Peck,13 the first case discussing
Indian rights, stated confidently that Indian title "is a mere occupancy for the
purpose of hunting. It is not like our tenures; they have no idea of a title to the
soil itself. It is overrun by them, rather than inhabited, ' 4 the case had nothing to
do with Indian interests. Instead it concerned the property rights of two white
Georgians who are widely agreed to have feigned their dispute in order to bring it
before the Supreme Court. 5 Similarly, the 1823 decision Johnson v. M'Intosh, in
which the Court first began to lay down the principles of federal power over
Indian affairs and Indian property, involved a property dispute between two white
men, who also, new evidence has shown, feigned their dispute. 7 In the 1846
decision United States v. Rogers,"5 as I have argued elsewhere, the Supreme Court
began to sketch out a vastly expanded vision of federal power over Indian tribes in
a case that involved federal jurisdiction over a white man who had died ten
months before the case was even argued.' 9 And in the 1883 decision Ex Parte
Crow Dog,2° the Court first affirmed federal power to pass laws regulating wholly
tribal matters21 in the criminal prosecution of a man who the executive branch
knew had already been punished by his tribe and pursued only to further its
campaign to expand federal jurisdiction.22
13. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
14. Id. at 121.
15. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court 225 (La. St. U. Press
2001).
16. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
17. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & Hist.
Rev. 67, 99-101 (2001).
18. 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
19. Bethany R. Berger, "Power Over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in
United States v. Rogers, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1957, 1999-2000 (2004).
20. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
21. Id. at 572. While the Court held that there was no federal jurisdiction to prosecute a crime
between tribal members under the laws currently in effect, it stated that such jurisdiction could be
created if there was a "clear expression of the intention of Congress .... Id.
22. Sidney L. Harring, Crow Dog's Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United
States Law in the Nineteenth Century 100-41 (Cambridge U. Press 1994).
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Even where decisions did emerge from real controversies, the controversies
were often between non-Indians, and therefore rarely considered Indian or tribal
perspectives on the issue. Utah & Northern Railway v. Fishery Maricopa &
Phoenix Railroad Company v. Arizona,24 and Thomas v. Gay< a series of late
nineteenth century cases that the modern Supreme Court has relied on in
26breaking down barriers to state jurisdiction in Indian country, were tax disputes
between states and non-Indian corporations or individuals in which tribes did not
participate. Similarly, Beecher v. Wetherby upon which the Court would later
rely to hold that lands held under aboriginal title were not protected by the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause,28 concerned a timber dispute between two white
men.2
9
Two of the significant exceptions to this rule of Indian absence are also two
of the strongest statements of tribal sovereignty yet produced by the courts of the
conqueror. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia30 and Worcester v. Georgia31 were the
result of concerted Cherokee action to protect sovereign rights, by both the
Cherokee leadership and the Cherokee people, for whom the briefs were
reprinted in the Cherokee Phoenix, the tribal newspaper. While the decisions can
be criticized for articulating a paternalistic relationship between the United States
and tribal nations,32 they also constructed a vision of complete independence of
tribal territory from state jurisdiction and a federal obligation to protect tribal
sovereignty that Congress and the courts have sadly failed to adhere to.
33
Of course, tribal participation is no guarantee of protection of tribal rights.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,34 which permitted Congress to abrogate treaties largely
shielded from judicial review,35 and which was called upon its release the Dred
Scott for Indian people,36 came after a many year, multi-forum effort by the
23. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
24. 156 U.S. 347 (1895).
25. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
26. See Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363 (citing Utah Railway to hold that state law enforcement
officials could serve process on Indian lands); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of
Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) (citing Thomas to hold that states could tax non-Indians
in purchases of cigarettes from tribe); McClanahan v. Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973) (citing Utah
Railway to support principal that "notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take account of
the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians"); Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72-74 (1962) (citing Utah Railway, Maricopa Railroad and Thomas to hold that
Alaska Natives were subject to state fishing regulations).
27. 95 U.S. 517 (1877).
28. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1955).
29. Beecher, 95 U.S. at 522. See Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title
Reconsidered, 37 Hastings L.J. 1215, 1244-45 (1980).
30. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
31. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
32. Berger, supra n. 19, at 1976; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Worcester, 31 U.S. 515.
33. I argue that the proper reading of the Cherokee opinions suggests a very limited idea of federal
power in Indian country in Berger, supra n. 19, at 1976-78.
34. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
35. Id. at 568.
36. David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of
Justice 116 (U. Tex. Press 1997).
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Kiowa, Caddo, and Comanche Tribes to prevent allotment of their land.37 Since
1986, tribes have become ever more significant participants in Indian law issues
before the courts, yet the tribal success rate in the Supreme Court has dropped
below even that of convicted criminals seeking to have their convictions
reversed.38 Even when tribal litigants are actively expressing their interests,
therefore, those interests are rarely the primary concern of the non-native justices.
Lara, therefore, was successful not only because tribal voices were not absent, but
also because they were able to unify and strategize their presence in a way that
was truly new.
II. ADDRESSING THE COUNTER ARGUMENT: LARA AS
HANDMAIDEN OF NON-INDIAN INTERESTS
One can of course make a plausible argument that Lara is simply the same
old story, one in which tribal interests happened to win only because it was in non-
Indian interests that they do so. First, the decision affirmed the breadth of
Congressional power over Indian affairs, a power that it is clearly in federal
interests to retain, and that the Court has never seen fit to check. Second, the
decision did not affect non-Indian people at all-it simply affirmed the criminal
jurisdiction of tribes over Indians from different tribes, jurisdiction that neither
the federal government nor the states wanted.39 Third, the decision that Congress
can not only place limits on sovereign authority but can also relax those
restrictions, particularly when placed in the context of American colonizing
actions in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico,4° inescapably calls to mind
current actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the United States has destroyed
national sovereignty with the fervent desire of reshaping it in a more democratic
(and America friendly) image.
But this version of Lara fails upon closer examination. In particular, the
decision was not simply the familiar narrative that Congress can do whatever it
wants with respect to Indian tribes, but that because Indian tribes are sovereigns,
Congress can, as it does with other sovereigns, relax restrictions on their inherent
sovereignty. 41 The Court did not need to go so far to uphold congressional power
to enact the Duro fix. It could have ruled, as did the Eighth Circuit en banc, that
the power Congress had given tribes to prosecute non-members existed, but it was
37. Ann Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in The Aggressions of
Civilization: Federal Indian Policy Since the 1880's, at 215, 216 (Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria,
Jr. eds., Temple U. Press 1984).
38. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-
Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 281 (2001).
39. In the 1991 hearings regarding tribal misdemeanor jurisdiction in Indian country, the federal
government, the Conference of Governors of Western States and numerous western state legislatures
were actively supporting the bill, with certain western attorneys general the only state or federal
officials opposing it, and even they wanted jurisdiction given to the federal government, not the states.
H.R. Comm. Int. & Insular Affairs, Hearing on H.R. 972, The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor
Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 102d Cong. 8, 12-13, 47, 213, 232, 235 (Apr. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Duro
House Hrg.].
40. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1635.
41. See id. at 1634-36.
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a delegated power, and so did not permit dual prosecutions for the same offense
without violating the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment.4 2 It
could also have held, as urged by amici Idaho, Alabama, Louisiana, Nebraska,
South Dakota and Utah, that even if Congress lacked the power to restore
inherent authority to tribes to prosecute non-members, as it clearly did not intend
to delegate federal power, there was no federal delegation of power so as to
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause, and. Lara's claim must therefore be
dismissed and brought, if at all, in a habeas challenge to the tribal court
conviction.43
The Court could also have suggested, as did the majority opinion of the
Ninth Circuit en banc in United States v. Enas," that congressional power to affirm
tribal inherent power was based on the historical existence of this power. In other
words, because the Supreme Court was interpreting history in holding that tribes
had been divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-members, Congress could
insert a corrected history.4 5 This path, which would fully vindicate Congressional
action in the Duro fix, would nevertheless undermine the theoretical analogy
between tribes and other sovereigns, like states and colonized nations, which are
not imagined to exercise "delegated" power when restrictions on their sovereign
authority are relaxed. It would also undermine the idea that Congress could
affirm "new" tribal inherent powers,46 and suggest instead that a painstaking
historical analysis was necessary before existing powers could be expanded 7
Along the same lines, the Court could also have suggested that the power to
restore tribal authority was limited to tribal jurisdiction over Indians. This too
would have vastly limited the scope of the decision, and would have ensured that
non-Indians were protected from congressional affirmations of tribal power.
The decision took none of these paths, although any of them would have
served immediate federal interests. Instead, it presented tribes as sovereigns with
a potential sovereign reach as great as that of states of the union and conquered
nations. This fact is neither an accident nor the result of a change of heart by the
Supreme Court but is instead the result of deliberate choices and actions by Indian
people across the United States.
42. U.S. v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 2003).
43. Br. of Amicus Curiae States of Idaho, Ala., La., Neb., S.D., and Utah at 3-4, Lara, 124 S. Ct.
1628 [hereinafter Idaho Br.].
44. 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001).
45. Id. at 669-71.
46. There is of course an irony in the suggestion that any tribal inherent powers are "new." Native
governments exercised complete sovereignty in what is now the United States long before any
representatives of European nations arrived here, a fact that has been acknowledged.by the Supreme
Court since at least 1831. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15 (describing the Cherokee Nation as "[a)
people once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain").
47. Cf. Enas, 255 F.3d at 680 n. 4 (Pregerson, Trott, Tashima & Fletcher, JJ., concurring) (arguing
that tribal power need not have historical roots to be inherent).
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III. INDIAN AGENCY AND THE DURO FIx
The path leading to Lara began on June 15, 1984, when Biscuit Brown, a
fourteen-year old boy, was shot and killed on the Salt River Pima Maricopa
Reservation. Albert Duro was believed to have shot the boy. Although neither
Duro nor Brown were members of the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian
Community, they each demonstrated the close links common between tribal
communities and the non-member Indians who enter them. Biscuit Brown was a
member of the Gila River Pima Maricopa Indian Community, which, although it is
a separate federally recognized tribe with a separate reservation, like Salt River is
composed of members of the historic Pima and Maricopa tribes. Albert Duro was
a member of the Torres Martinez Band of Cahuilla Indians of California, but lived
on the Salt River reservation with his Pima-Maricopa girlfriend and worked for
18the tribe's construction company. After the federal district attorney declined to
prosecute Duro,49 the tribe, which had used the profits from tribal economic
development projects to enhance its law enforcement capabilities, decided to
prosecute him itself.) Duro filed a habeas petition challenging tribal jurisdiction,
and on May 29, 1990, the Supreme Court held that the tribe had no criminal
jurisdiction over Indians that were not members of their tribes.5'
The reaction in Indian country was immediate. By June 8, 1990, the
National Congress of American Indians ("NCAI") had convened a meeting of
tribal, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and congressional representatives to discuss the
52implications of the case and discuss possible legislative responses. NCAI then
organized a June 25, 1990, meeting of tribal leaders from across the country on a
53fix to the problem. Over the course of dozens of meetings that summer, the
legislation was re-shaped and Indian communities were mobilized behind the
proposal.54  According to Virginia Boylan, then Deputy Director and Senior
Counsel of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, "Millions of people were
calling all the time it felt like .... The outcry was clear and it was solid and
everybody knew we had to fix it."'55 The response was so fast it caught the
Conference of the Western Attorneys General, frequent opponents of tribes in
48. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
49. Fergus M. Bordewich, Killing the White Man's Indian: Reinventing Native Americans at the End
of the Twentieth Century 94 (Doubleday 1996).
50. Id. at 94-95.
51. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
52. Memo re: Meeting in Washington, D.C., to Discuss Duro Case (June 11, 1990) (copy on file with
Tulsa Law Review).
53. Memo. from Wayne L. Ducheneaux, Pres., NCAI, to All Tribal Leaders, Supreme Court
Decision In Duro v. Reina (June 18, 1990) [hereinafter Ducheneaux Memorandum] (copy on file with
Tulsa Law Review).
54. Interview with Nell Jessup Newton, Dean, U. Conn. L. Sch. (October 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Newton Interview]; see also Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17
Am. Indian L. Rev. 109, 110 (1992).
55. Interview with Virginia Boylan, Partner, Carton, Gardner & Douglas, former Dep. Dir. and
Senior Counsel, Sen. Comm. Indian Affairs, (Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Boylan Interview].
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Congress and the courts, off guard. In an August 3, 1990, unanimous resolution,
the Attorney General plaintively declared:
WHEREAS, proposals have been made to overturn this decision of the United
States Supreme Court as a result of meetings in Washington, D.C., convened less
than a month after the decision, wherein representatives of tribal governments and
others made their views known; and
WHEREAS, this is the first opportunity that the Western Attorneys General
have had to jointly consider a response to the efforts to overturn Duro v. Reina and
make their views known to Congress and the Governors of their respective states,
56
they urged Congress to take no action on the proposal, but instead to affirm that
the federal government had jurisdiction over misdemeanors by non-member
Indians.57 The Attorneys General were too late. On November 5, 1990, just six
months after the decision, a provision affirming tribal inherent jurisdiction over
non-member Indians was enacted as part of a defense appropriations bill.
58
To placate Senator Slade Gorton, a strong opponent of the bill,' 9 the law was
scheduled to expire on September 30, 1991.60 On February 19, 1991, Congressman
Bill Richardson of New Mexico introduced H.R. 972, which would have struck the
time limitation from the bill. 61 Richardson credited Kevin Gover, an attorney for
multiple tribes, Philip S.0 Deloria of the American Indian Law Center, and other
New Mexico tribes for their assistance in drafting the legislation.62 On April 11,
1991, the House Committee on Insular and Interior Affairs held hearings on the
bill. 6' By this time, the opposition had marshaled its forces-the Utah Attorney
General, on behalf of the Attorneys General from Utah, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington,64 the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance,65
and several western county attorneys,66 all registered their opposition to the law.
The U.S. Attorney for South Dakota, on behalf of the U.S. Attorneys
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, supported the bill, but testified that it should be
tied to broader federal review of tribal court actions.67
56. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 56-57.
57. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-1893 (1990). Because it was very late in the
session, the law needed to be placed on a vehicle already going through the process. Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, an important sponsor of the bill, was chair of the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee,
and included the law in the Act. Boylan Interview, supra n. 55; see also Newton, supra n. 54, at 111.
59. Interview with Tadd Johnson, Counsel, H.R. Comm. Int. & Insular Affairs (Nov. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter Johnson Interview].
60. H.R. Conf. Rpt. 101-938 (Oct. 24, 1990).
61. Sen. Rpt. 102-168 at 14 (Oct. 2, 1991).
62. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 106. Deloria thanked him for the recognition, but also
mentioned that "[y]our bill is blessedly brief and I don't know which word I was responsible for in that
short bill, but I appreciate the acknowledgement." Id. at 122.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Id. at 66.
66. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 52.
67. Id. at 13, 18 (testimony of Philip Hogen, U.S. Atty.).
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Indian country was prepared. Opponents of the bill were overwhelmed by
witness after witness from Indian organizations and tribes. 8  By this time
numerous non-Indian organizations had submitted resolutions of support as well,
including the Conference of Western Governors, several western state
legislatures, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights,
and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.69
Although there was non-Indian support for the law, advocates from within
the Indian community were not only the engine of the Duro fix but also
fundamentally shaped its form. The law represented a new and creative
formulation of congressional acts regarding tribal power. In its previous cases,
including Duro, the Supreme Court had referred only to congressional
"delegations" of jurisdiction to Indian tribes.7" The initial proposals for the Duro
fix were that it too "delegate" power to the tribes.71 But when these proposals got
to the American Indian Law Center ("AILC") in Albuquerque that summer, the
proposal changed. In a June 16, 1990, conference organized by the National
American Indian Court Judges Association, Deloria, Director of the AILC,
expressed concern that truly delegated power would be subject to constitutional
restrictions not normally applicable to tribal governments, and that perhaps
Congress could instead correct the Court's understanding of tribal inherent
72jurisdiction. On June 25, Deloria laid out the advantages and constitutional basis
for such an approach in a letter to the attorneys for the House and Senate
Committees on Indian Affairs. 3 In the next month, Nell Jessup Newton, a
professor of Constitutional and American Indian law, who was teaching in the
AILC Pre-Law Summer Institute for native students entering law school,
corresponded with Virginia Boylan of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to
argue for the approach and propose the language that would ultimately become
the Duro fix.74 Together, Deloria and Newton convinced the Indian and legal
communities not to rely on the Supreme Court's language of delegation, but
instead to do something wholly new. The ultimate proposal that went to Congress
made clear that the law "recognized and affirmed" the "inherent power of Indian
tribes ... to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians."75 The result was that
reached in Lara: the Court could only hold that Congress intended that tribes
exercising jurisdiction over non-members under the Duro fix were exercising
68. See generally id.
69. Id.; see also Sen Rpt. 102-153 (Sept. 19, 1991).
70. Duro, 495 U.S. at 686; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978); U.S. v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975).
71. Ducheneaux Memorandum, supra n. 53.
72. Notes of Nell Jessup Newton, NAIJCA Conference (June 16, 1990) (copy on file with Tulsa Law
Review).
73. Ltr. from Philip S. Deloria to Franklin Ducheneaux and Pete Taylor (June 25, 1990) (copy on
file with Tulsa Law Review).
74. See Ltr. from Nell Jessup Newton to Virginia Boylan (July 13, 1990) (copy on file with Tulsa
Law Review); Facsimile from Boylan to Newton (July 20, 1990) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
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inherent tribal, not federal, power, and the Constitution did not prevent this
result.
The choices made in drafting the Duro fix were not only legally but also
politically savvy. Despite anger over Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,76 the
1978 Supreme Court case holding that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians within their borders, and the widespread agreement that it was
inconsistent with past principles of federal Indian law, there was no effort to
include criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the law. As Deloria testified in
1991, in the year he had been talking to tribal leaders about the Duro fix, "I have
never once heard a tribal leader suggest that the repeal or overruling by Congress
of Duro was the first step in a plan to overrule the Oliphant case .... I think
we're more politically realistic than that.",7 7 In other words, the tribes realized that
however flawed the Oliphant decision, Congress was not going to give tribes
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
This realism was necessary. The choice not to raise the question of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians took the wind from the sails of anti-tribal activists,
like William Covey of the Citizens Equal Rights Alliance, who sought to persuade
the panel that opposing the bill "is important to non-Indians, too, because we're
next., 78 It laid the groundwork for this response by Congressman John Rhodes of
Arizona:
I just, quite frankly, fail[] to buy into the notion that if we were to pass H.R.
972, we're irrevocably setting ourselves to the path towards extending tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. I think even Congress can see the difference between
trying to patch a hole created by the Duro case and extending tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians.79
Mr. Rhodes also confirmed that tribes had accurately assessed congressional
willingness to overturn Oliphant in his subsequent statement: "[n]ow you're going
to respond that, yes, legally it can be done... and I'm going to say to you I know
that, and you know that's factually not going to happen."80
Another striking thing about the Duro fix is how quickly diverse Indian
communities from across the country were able to marshal unified and passionate
support for the bill. This was possible not simply because of the mobilizing effect
of a decision that "created a class of citizens that were immune from prosecution
for criminal violations,"8' and "upset [Indian] expectations so deeply,, 82 although
these factors surely helped. Rather, it was a product of the culmination of decades
of building organizational ties linking tribes and native people throughout the
United States.
76. 435 U.S. 191.
77. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 124 (testimony of Philip S. Deloria, Dir., Am. Indian L. Ctr.)
78. Id. at 66 (testimony of William H. Covey, Pres., Citizens Equal Rights Alliance).
79. Id. at 75 (statement of Congressman Rhodes) (emphasis in original).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 206 (statement of Delia Carlyle, Chairman Ak-Chin Indian Community).
82. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 153 (testimony of Rick Collins, Prof., U. Colo.).
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When Europeans first came to this continent, most tribal nations considered
themselves separate peoples, no more linked than pre-European Union Germans
considered themselves linked to the French.83 To a degree, this remains true for
members of modern tribes, for whom tribal identity is usually prior to and more
important than Indian identity. 4  But as sociologist Stephen Cornell has
documented, in the face of European and American colonialism, and in part
through federal actions in placing members of different tribes together in boarding
schools, on joint reservations; and in urban centers, members of different tribes
came to realize that while they were not the same, they had more in common with
each other than with the non-Indian colonizers.85 More important, they realized
that the same means would often serve their separate interests in tribal survival8 6
This realization has been accompanied by a flood of new organizations
linking Indian people and tribes. The NCAI, the first national supra-tribal
organization focused on tribal survival, was founded in 1944.87 A myriad of other
organizations have followed, including the American Indian Law Center in 1967,
the National American Indian Court Judges Association in 1969, the Native
American Rights Fund in 1970, as well as a host of regional interest groups
harnessing the energies of native nations and Indian people in tandem. 
8
The ties created by these organizations mean that political protest from
Indian country is fundamentally different than the failed efforts of tribes to
prevent removal, allotment, or termination. When tribes traveled to Washington,
D.C., to protest against the allotment policy at the end of the nineteenth century,
83. See Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence 106-07
(Oxford U. Press 1988). Like modem nations, however, there were different kinds of bonds between
separate groups, some formed by cultural, ethnic, or religious ties, others by political confederacies. Id.
at 74.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Id. at 106-144.
86. Id. at 147. Thus, while involvement by Indian activists in American politics is sometimes
condemned as an abstraction from membership in sovereign tribal nations, for the participants
themselves such activism is often precisely about their tribal identities. Winnebago political activist
Frank LaMere, for example, responded to a question about whether "mainstream political
involvement tends to dilute Indian people's tribal identity" by saying:
I don't think that could be further from the truth. Our involvement in the political process
as Native individuals requires a great deal of responsibility. We must be acutely aware of
our tribal interests. We must be careful when we convey our tribal interests. And we must
always carefully weigh the risks and consider the outcomes.
It requires that we carry a burden-and one that I take very seriously. We must be more
informed than the rest of our Indian brothers and sisters, more informed than others we
encounter in the political process, if we are to responsibly carry our tribal interests. We must
be more informed, have more resolve, and have an idea about the long-range impact that
our work will have on our tribal people for generations to come.
Lavelle, supra n. 1, at 559.
87. Cornell, supra n. 83, at 119.
88. These organizations have also reached out to develop ties with non-Indian organizations. The
American Indian Law Center together with the NCAI, for example, worked with organizations
representing state interests to form the Commission on State-Tribal Relations, which held hearings and
conferences to find common ground and increase cooperation between states and tribes. Efforts like
these laid the groundwork for the state support for both the Duro-fix and the tribal position in Lara.
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some arrived too late to make themselves heard,89 and even those that arrived on
time spoke as representatives of individual tribes, imperceptible over the voices of
the "Friends of the Indian" insisting allotment was in Indian interests.9° Similarly,
in 1953, when Congress enacted the resolution to terminate the federal
relationship with Indian tribes, it did so without debate or even the knowledge of
American Indians, and yet with the announced goal of making Indians "free."9' In
part because of the organizational links and expertise developed in trying to halt
termination,92 political participation by Indian tribes has undergone a sea change.
Today, tribes and Indian advocates can share knowledge and economic resources
to use their voice most effectively, and can present a unified voice, one that can
drown out those that claim to know what Indians really want.
These factors were crucial in the passage of the Duro fix. The ability to
immediately mobilize the national Indian leadership in the wake of Duro and
unify it behind a single legislative proposal would not have existed without the
extensive links between native communities that had developed since the 1940s.
In the congressional hearings as well, the presence of representatives from every
sector of Indian country was decisive. When the U.S. Attorney from South
Dakota,93 the President of the Citizens for Equal Rights Alliance,94 and the Utah
Attorney General95 expressed concern about depriving non-member Indians of
constitutional rights, there was Kevin Gover, a member of the Pawnee Comanche
Tribe and an attorney representing multiple tribes, to say that "the Indians who
are here before you, we say freely when we go onto another reservation, we are
willing to be subject to those laws. That is what we prefer, frankly, to being
subject to the States or even to the U.S. courts."96 There was Deloria, a member
of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, to explain the kind of political influence non-
member Indians, even without the right to vote, had on reservations, and to say
that he had lived on reservations of two tribes of which he was not a member and
he "felt safer living on the Pine Ridge Reservation than I certainly do living in
Albuquerque, New Mexico sometimes." 97 There was also the NCAI to present a
survey of the high number of non-member Indians on reservations and their
integration in tribal communities,9 and testimony and written statements from
representatives of multiple tribes, 99 many of them also representing other national
89. Estin, supra n. 37, at 216.
90. For a description of the Friends of the Indian and their contribution to the passage of the
allotment acts, see Francis Paul Prucha, Introduction, in Americanizing the American Indians: Writings
by the "Friends of the Indian" 1880-1900, at 1, 3-9 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., Harvard U. Press 1975).
91. Gary Orfield, A Study of the Termination Policy, in Sen. Comm. Lab. & Pub. Welfare, The
Education of American Indians: The Organizational Question, 673, 674-75 (U.S. Govt. Prtg. Off. 1970).
92. Cornell, supra n. 83, at 124, 126.
93. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 41 (testimony of Philip Hogen, U.S. Atty.).
94. Id. at 67 (testimony of William H. Covey, Pres., Citizens Equal Rights Alliance).
95. Id. at 46 (testimony of Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Utah).
96. Id. at 88 (testimony of Kevin Gover, Atty., Gover, Stetson & Williams).
97. Id. at 124-25 (testimony of Philip S. Deloria, Dir., Am. Indian L. Ctr.).
98. The final survey is reprinted in Sen Rpt. 102-153 app. E (Sept. 19, 1991).
99. Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at 86, 92, 99, 117, 162, 171, 186, 191, 201, 206.
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or regional Indian organizations. There could be no question that the people that
actually knew what was good for the Indians agreed that the bill was in their
interests.
The bill left the House Committee and was passed unanimously by the
House on September 25, 1991. Its passage was not so smooth in the Senate.
Senator Slade Gorton, the "Indian fighter" from Washington, 1°° was strongly
opposed to the bill, and would not let it out of the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs without both a provision that it would expire in two years and a
promise to hold hearings on a bill to provide federal court review of civil claims
under the Indian Civil Rights Act. 01 In the Conference Committee meetings to
resolve the discrepancies between the House and Senate Bills, Representatives
Miller, Richardson, and Rhodes refused to accept the sunset provision, l02 and the
Senators that had promised Gorton the sunset clause felt they could not go back
on their commitment. 103 During the impasse, the temporary Duro legislation
expired.' °n Tribes sent a flood of outraged telegrams to the Committee members,
and the House representatives held firm.105 Ultimately, Senator Gorton released
his fellow senators from their commitment and the Senate permitted the original
House bill to reach the Senate floor.1°6 The Senate passed the bill, and the
President signed it into law on October 28, 1991.107 (In a nice coda to this battle, in
2000 Senator Gorton lost his re-election campaign against Democrat Maria
Cantwell in a narrow defeat that many attribute to a successful effort from Indian
Country to mobilize native voters against him.)'08
The passage of the Duro fix was not simply a moment when tribal interests
prevailed because they happened to accord with congressional interests, or an
isolated instance in which tribal outrage was so unanimous that tribes
spontaneously came together to exert their will. Rather, it was the product of
many years of building political resources in Indian country, and the impact of
those resources in overcoming non-Indian objections. It was a reflection of a
significant change in the form of political participation of Indian people, one that
not only secured the passage of the Duro fix, but also helped to ensure that since
1970, Congress has not passed general legislation regarding Indian tribes over
Indian opposition.
100. Lewis Kamb, Tribes Flex Growing Muscle at Ballot Box: 'Great Victory' over Gorton in 2000
Points the Way, Seattle Post-Intelligencer Al (Mar. 9, 2004).
101. Newton, supra n. 54, at 116; see Sen Rpt. 102-153 at 13 (amendment adding new sunset
provision).
102. Johnson Interview, supra n. 59.
103. Id.
104. Newton, supra n. 54, at 116; Johnson Interview, supra n. 59.
105. Newton, supra n. 54, at 116-17; Johnson Interview, supra n. 59.
106. H.R. Conf. Rpt. 102-261 at 1 (Oct. 22, 1991) (Senate recedes from its amendment to the bill);
Newton, supra n. 54, at 117.
107. Newton, supra n. 54, at 117.
108. Kamb, supra n. 100, at A5.
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Tribes are far from achieving all they want in the legislature. People of
native descent are only 1.5 percent of the population of the United States, 109
compose no more than a small minority of the electorate in any state,110 and so,
except in very close races, have little electoral muscle.' Nor, in most states, do
they have the kind of economic resources that make politicians take notice. While
some tribes have made money from casino gaming, the poverty rate among
American Indians and Alaska Natives is still about 25 percent, similar to that for
Latinos and African Americans." 2 Native contributions to federal races,
moreover, only make up about 0.2 percent of all contributions, although Native
people are 1.5 percent of the population." 3
This lack of electoral muscle is visible in Congress. Congress is still unlikely
to restore tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and has not yet acted on
proposals to reverse judicial decimation of tribal civil and regulatory
jurisdiction." 4  And while Congress has created many programs to provide
services to Indian people and return those programs to tribal control, its
unwillingness to appropriate adequate funds for those programs has created what
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights calls a "quiet crisis" in Indian country." 5 In
addition, given the diversity between and within Indian communities, there
continue to be serious and divisive conflicts over both goals and the means to
achieve them. But Indian people have come a long way from the "remnants of a
race once powerful," whose claims to the U.S. Congress were based on "their very
weakness and helplessness., 116 While they still do not dictate the terms of the
debate, they can occassionally guide it to serve their needs. The Duro fix is a
product of this guidance.
109. U.S. Census Bureau, The American Indian and Alaska Native Population: 2000, 5 (Feb. 2002)
(available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr0l-15.pdf). The same figure for those that
indicate Indian or Alaska Native as their only race is 0.9 percent. While many people identifying as
native are in fact mixed race, the vast increase in the native population with the new option of
designating more than one race on the 2000 census suggests that many people whose primary sense of
identity is not native are identifying as part native on the census. Id.
110. In Alaska, the state with the largest proportion of people of native descent, native people
compose only 19 percent of the population. The next highest proportion is 10.5 percent, in New
Mexico, and they compose less than two percent of the population in the vast majority of states, rarely
enough to compose a significant voting block. Id.
111. The recent election, in which George Bush was reelected and Senator Tom Daschle of South
Dakota was defeated, despite a coordinated and successful effort to increase native voting and
significant support of the Democratic candidates, shows that even in close races the Indian vote may
not be decisive. See e.g. Indianz.com, South Dakota Tribes Announce Support for Daschle,
www.indianz.com/News/2004/004933.asp (Oct. 22, 2004); Indianz.com, South Dakota Indian Voter
Turnout a Record High, www.indianz.com/News/2004/005194.asp (Nov. 4, 2004).
112. Am. Indian Graduate Ctr., American Indian Census Facts: American Indians by the Numbers
from Census 2000, http://www.aigc.com//articles/ai-census-facts.html (accessed Nov. 12, 2004).
113. Kamb, supra n. 100, at A5.
114. See e.g. Sen. Comm. Indian Affairs, Hearing on Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They
Affect the Powers and Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments, 107th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2002).
115. U.S. Commn. Civ. Rights, A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet Needs in Indian Country
113 (2003) (available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf).
116. U.S.v. Kagama, 188 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
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IV. LARA AND INDIAN AGENCY IN THE COURTS
Sadly, winning in Congress is not enough. In the same period in which
political unity and activism has fundamentally changed the treatment of Indian
people by Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken up the standard as the
enemy of tribal rights. As both Congress and the Executive have increasingly
expressed support for tribal independence and economic and institutional
development, the Court has increasingly ravaged the barriers to state jurisdiction
in Indian country and the scope of tribal jurisdiction there. Decisions affecting
tribal interests are no longer made in the course of disputes between non-Indians
or in the absence of tribal voices, but instead in battles in which tribes themselves
are vocal and often initiating parties. Despite this, as documented by Professor
David Getches, tribal interests lost in 77 percent of Supreme Court decisions
between 1986 (when William Rehnquist became Chief Justice) and 2000, down
from a 58 percent win rate between 1969 and 1986, when Warren Burger was
Chief Justice. u 7 To respond to this trend, Indian people are again unifying to
share their knowledge and strategic resources, this time in the courts.'18 In Lara,
we see the first significant results of this effort.
In 2002, the Native American Rights Fund and the NCAI created the Tribal
Supreme Court Project ("Project") to respond to the crisis in the Court with the
same kind of organizational links and pooling of expertise that have proved so
effective in Congress. The Project has built a Supreme Court Project Working
Group of hundreds of attorneys and academics to share legal information and
experience.119 "An Advisory Board of Tribal leaders" adds political expertise and
120
a tribal perspective to these legal resources.
The Project sometimes calls upon tribes to sacrifice their individual interests
when necessary to pursue the collective goals of the project.1 In particular,
because one of the goals of the project is to keep cases unlikely to result in success
(most cases in the current Court) out of the Supreme Court, tribes may be asked
not to appeal cases in which they have lost, or settle, where possible, cases they
have won.' 22 But keeping Indian law issues out of the Court is often not possible.
Because the Court has not yet decimated all the fundamental principles of Indian
law, tribes often win cases below and do not have the option of choosing not to
appeal. Or, as in Lara, tribes are not litigants in the action at all and so have even
less control over the decision to request certiorari. So many cases are still
appealed, and the Court still agrees to hear some of them.
When certiorari is granted in a case involving tribal rights, the Project offers
the litigants the resources of the Working Group to try to ensure that the best
117. Getches, supra n. 38, at 280-81.
118. Labin, supra n. 2, at 696.
119. Id. at 697.
120. Id. at 698.
121. Id.
122. Id.
20041
TULSA LAW REVIEW
possible argument is presented to the Court.'23 It also coordinates a nationwide
amicus brief writing network, coordinating tribes and other groups to "ensure that
the briefs and the Indian voice receive the Court's maximum attention., 124 The
point is not to overwhelm the Court with briefs; rather, "[t]he rationale of the
Project is to submit to the Court the fewest number and the highest quality briefs
in support of the Indian argument.
12 1
Until Lara, the work of the Project has essentially helped to hold the line in
Indian law. The year after the Project was created, the Court granted certiorari in
three cases, United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,126 United States v.
Navajo Nation,127 and Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community.128 White Mountain Apache and Navajo Nation both concerned the
obligation of the United States to pay for the damages caused in violating the
federal trust responsibility with respect to tribal property. Although the Court
had not ruled on this issue since 1982, trust responsibility was not thought to be a
particularly dangerous area for Indian tribes, as it did not involve state rights or
tribal jurisdiction over non-members. The Court ruled for the White Mountain
Apache Tribe and against the Navajo Nation, a result that did some damage to the
trust doctrine, but did not wholly undermine it. Inyo County could have been an
even more serious blow for the tribes, as it concerned whether a state entity could
enforce a search warrant against a tribe concerning alleged off-reservation crimes
committed by its members. This case should easily have been decided in favor of
the tribes, but as the Court had implied in 2001 that states might be able serve
process on Indian individuals on reservation for off-reservation crimes,129 there
were fears the Court might affirm this power and breach tribal sovereign
immunity to extend the power to tribes themselves. Fortunately, the Court
punted, deciding that tribes were not "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so that the
substantive issue was not properly before the Court. 30 When the year was over,
with a win, a loss, and a draw, the Supreme Court Project could point at least to an
improved win-loss rate, and no catastrophic damage to tribal rights.
But with Lara, a punt was unlikely-the Court had already rejected two
petitions for certiorari on the impact of the Duro fix on dual tribal-federalS 131
prosecutions, and now had a split between two en banc federal circuits. The
Working Group fired up, holding dozens of conference calls about who should
132
write amicus briefs and what arguments they should make. The result was just
123. Labin, supra n. 2, at 698-99.
124. Id. at 699.
125. Id.
126. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
127. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
128. 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
129. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 363-64.
130. Inyo County, 538 U.S. at 704.
131. U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1115 (2002); U.S. v.
Weaselhead, 165 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 (1999).
132. Interview with Robert Anderson, L. Prof., U. Wash. (Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Anderson
Interview].
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two briefs, one on behalf of the NCAI, which would make the constitutional
arguments in support of construing the Duro fix as a valid affirmation of inherent
tribal authority, and the other on behalf of eighteen tribes, including the Spirit
Lake Sioux Nation where Billy Jo Lara resided, presenting the tribal perspective
and the policy arguments in favor of upholding the Duro fix as written.
The choices made in these briefs clearly reflect a tribal perspective on both
the tribal-federal relationship and the lived realities of reservation communities.
In arguing for tribal inherent jurisdiction under the Duro fix, the U.S. Attorney in
Enas had stated that, "Tribal sovereignty is a vessel that Congress may fill or drain
at its pleasure,, 133 a metaphor which, while it supported congressional power to
affirm inherent sovereignty, presented that sovereignty as an insignificant thing,
the toy of Congress. The NCAI briefs did not rely on such demeaning metaphors.
Instead, relying on arguments made by advocates for the Duro fix from the
beginning,3 they argued that plenary power over tribes was like that over states
under the Commerce Clause, and just as states exercised inherent, not delegated,
authority when Congress relaxed common law restrictions on state authority, so
did tribes under the Duro fix.'35 In addition, the brief stated, although Congress
had usually used its plenary power to diminish tribal sovereignty, there was
nothing to suggest that "Congress's authority in this area is a one-way ratchet,
permitting diminution of tribal sovereignty but never the recognition or
affirmation of it."' 136 The arguments centered not on the boundless nature of
congressional power, but on its relationship to tribal sovereignty: "It is precisely
because a Tribe is a sovereign governmental authority that Congress may
authorize the Tribe qua sovereign to exercise sovereign powers, rather than to act
as a federal agency." '137 Congressional action in lifting the common law restriction
on tribal jurisdiction no more converted tribes into federal instrumentalities than
Public Law 280, lifting common law restrictions on state jurisdiction in Indian
country, did for states.
13 8
The members of the Working Group also encouraged sympathetic states to
submit an amicus brief of their own, with the result that Washington, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon-most of the
states with the largest Indian communities in the Nation-filed a brief fully
supporting the United States. 139 The brief was an effective counterweight to the
133. Enas, 255 F.3d at 680 (Pregerson, Trott, Tashima & Fletcher, JJ., concurring) (quoting Richard
A. Friedman, Counsel for the U.S. in Enas and Lara) (internal alterations omitted).
134. See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over
Non-Member Indians: An Examination of the Basic Framework of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty Before
and After Duro v. Reina, 38 Fed. B. News & J. 70, 70-71 (Mar. 1991); Duro House Hrg., supra n. 39, at
125-27 (testimony of Nell Jessup Newton, L. Prof., Catholic U.).
135. Br. of Amicus Curiae Natl. Cong. of Am. Indians at 3, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter NCAI
Br.].
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Anderson Interview, supra n. 132; see Br. of Amici Curiae States of Wash., Ariz., Cal., Colo.,
Mich., Mont., N.M., and Or., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 [hereinafter Washington Br.].
2004]
TULSA LAW REVIEW
far less supportive brief filed by six other states.' 4° Editorial assistance from the
members of the working group also helped to ensure that the brief of the
sympathetic states did not detract from the focus on tribal sovereignty.' 4'
The NCAI brief also made what I believe was a new argument-that
congressional delegation of jurisdiction was potentially more constitutionally
problematic than affirmation, because Articles I and III of the U.S. Constitution
impose appointment and supervision requirements on courts exercising federal
power not met by tribal courts, 142 so that affirmation may have been the only way
of meeting the federal goal in the law. This argument may have been particularly
designed by the Working Groups' Supreme Court specialists, and was persuasive
to Justice Thomas, who concurred in the Lara judgment, 43 despite his usual anti-
tribal jurisprudence.
In addition, the brief did not dwell on whether the Supreme Court got its
history wrong in suggesting that tribes had lost inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-members. In one of the early Lara conference calls, the group agreed that
they would not rely on this argument in the NCAI brief,'" even though it had
proved successful in Enas.145 The historical argument was left for the brief by the
tribes, part of the policy argument for upholding the affirmation, rather than
justification for congressional power to do so. 46
The tribes' brief also emphasized the reality of non-member Indians in
Indian country, and the tribes' need for reversal of the Duro decision "to keep the
peace in their communities.' ' 47  The brief of the tribes also gave the fullest
descriptions of the facts concerning Lara, a prime exemplar of this need-he lived
on the reservation of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe, abused his Spirit Lake Sioux
wife, refused to obey an exclusion order to leave the reservation, and knocked out
a federal officer when he and a tribal officer tried to arrest Lara for an
outstanding warrant and public intoxication.' 8
The decision in Lara reflected the influence of both of these briefs, citing the
tribes' brief for the status of Lara in the Spirit Lake Sioux community, 49 and
relying, both in oral argument, and in the decision, on the notion that
congressional power over tribal sovereignty was not a one-way ratchet. 5 0 The
briefs also appear to have influenced the Court's description of congressional
140. Idaho Br., supra n. 43.
141. Anderson Interview, supra n. 132.
142. NCAI Br., supra n. 135, at 27.
143. 124 S. Ct. at 1641-48.
144. Anderson Interview, supra n. 132.
145. 255 F.3d at 669-71.
146. Br. of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Eighteen Am. Indian Tribes at 22-29, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id. at 4-6.
149. 124 S. Ct. at 1631.
150. Oral Argument at 33, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628 (asking respondent: "Where-where do you get the
authority for that one-way ratcheting when we've said that Congress has plenary power over the
tribes?"); Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1635-36 ("Lara points to no explicit language in the Constitution
suggesting a limitation on Congress' institutional authority to relax restrictions on tribal sovereignty
previously imposed by the political branches.").
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plenary power, which analogized that power to that Congress had with respect to
colonized sovereign nations, and part of an ongoing relationship with a sovereign
community,151 rather than the creature of tribal dependence and helplessness the
Court had described it as in the past.152 Although early in his career Justice
Stevens had expressed concern about subjection of non-members to tribal
jurisdiction, 153 in Lara he concurred specifically to reiterate the tribal position that,
"[gliven the fact that Congress can authorize the States to exercise-as their
own-inherent powers that the Constitution has otherwise placed off limits, I find
nothing exceptional in the conclusion that it can also relax restrictions on an
ancient inherent tribal power.' 54 Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment,
musing on the inconsistency between unrestrained federal plenary power and
tribal sovereignty. 5 Coordinated legal advocacy may finally be having the effect
of educating the Court, at least on a case-by-case basis.
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND LARA
The Lara decision does not mean that tribes can now rest easy. The Court
specifically did not address Lara's equal protection and due process arguments,
156
leaving those open for another litigant. The case did not involve non-Indians or
challenge state or federal rights on reservations, classic danger zones for tribes.
Rather, it concerned an assertion of federal power over Indian people supported
both by the federal government and by several states.57 We should all, therefore,
still celebrate when the Court denies certiorari to review a good decision
regarding state jurisdiction in Indian country, as it did in South Dakota v.
Cummings,158 and tremble when it grants certiorari to review another, as it did in
Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. City of Sherrill.5 9
But in Lara, for the first time in years, we have a Supreme Court decision
that alters the judicial description of tribal sovereignty so as to expand rather than
151. Lara, 124 S. Ct. at 1634-36.
152- See e.g. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,552 (1974); Kagama, 188 U.S. at 384.
153. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 170-73 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. 124 S. Ct. at 1639.
155. Id. at 1641-42 (Thomas, J., concurring). I have no doubt that if Justice Thomas were writing on
a blank slate, he would eliminate the sovereignty leaving only the power, although stare decisis renders
this solution impossible. But this opinion, along with the majority and Stevens opinions, each suggest a
more nuanced perspective on the tribal-federal relationship than we have previously seen from this
court.
156. Id. at 1638-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
157. See Br. of U.S., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628; See Washington Br., supra n. 139. There were also many
non-Indian opponents of a finding of inherent tribal jurisdiction. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Natl. Assn.
of Crim. Def. Laws., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628; Br. of Amicus Curiae of the Citizens Equal Rights Found.,
Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628; Idaho Br., supra n. 43; Br. of Amicus Curiae Thomas Lee Morris, Elizabeth S.
Morris, & Roland J. Morris, Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628; Br. of Amicus Curiae of Lewis County, Idaho, Mille
Lacs County, Minn., & Thurston County, Neb., Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628.
158. 679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 355 (2004).
159. 337 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 124 S.
Ct. 2904 (2004).
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contract it. 16° The catalyst of this decision was not the federal government, the
states, or the Supreme Court, but rather the efforts from Indian country to create
a new option in the face of judicial divestiture, and ensure that both Congress and
the Supreme Court understood and preserved that option.
This success suggests a way that, despite Justice Thomas's comments,
plenary power can be made more consistent with tribal sovereignty. It is when,
first, it is truly understood as a plenary power to meet Congress's "unique
obligation toward the Indians ' ' 161 and second, when the contours of that unique
obligation are determined in consultation with tribes themselves. The Court has
recited variations on the first part of this equation for years, but Congress has
never until recently exercised its plenary power consistently with the second part.
The story of the Duro fix shows why it has begun to: Not because Congress is any
more or less interested in what matters to Indians, but because Indian people are
demanding that they be consulted, and are doing so with a unity, organization, and
political sophistication that makes those demands difficult to ignore. In the Duro
fix and the Lara case, congressional plenary power was "tamed, reined-in, and
otherwise expertly handled by 'real Indian people' as a vehicle for strengthening
rather than destroying tribal sovereignty."'1 62 Both in Congress and the Court, it
took tremendous energy to handle the plenary power beast and it is still a
dangerous one. The full history of United States v. Lara, however, provides hope
that Indian people can guide that beast to serve their needs.
160. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999), was the last significant
win in the Supreme Court, and even that case, affirming treaty-preserved hunting and fishing rights
were not abrogated in the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, held the line rather
than breaking new ground in Indian law.
161. Morton, 417 U.S. at 555.
162. LaVelle, supra n. 1, at 538 (internal alterations omitted). Professor LaVelle used this phrase to
describe the exercise of American citizenship by Indian people, not the plenary power doctrine, so any
disagreements with my perspective on the plenary power doctrine should be directed at me alone.
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